Organizações criminosas e Poder Judiciário by Lucas, Flávio Oliveira



























Flávio oliveira lucas 
The lawyer Jorgina de Freitas, convicted for fraud against the state Pensions Fund, makes-
up one of the contestants in the beauty contest at Bangu prison, rio de Janeiro.
Introduction
ConFrontIng organized crime is a theme that not only sets the order of business for the judiciary (both national and international), but also fills a significant number of pages in the national press, a 
clear indication of the extent to which the theme has not only attracted the 
attention of specialists, but of the population in general. 
In a way, the attention invested in the theme ends up making it a 
prime target for those who, by some means or other, wish to exploit it for 
their own political gain. thus we see the sudden emergence of self-styled 
“specialists” in public security in general and in the combat of organized 
Crime in particular; generally prescribing miraculous solutions that would 
seem to have been visited upon them by divine messenger. 
Behind all this political exploitation of such a serious matter lies the 
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feeling of insecurity and fear that has assailed the population and driven it 
into hiding before the sheer force of the violence practiced upon it by criminal 
organizations, and given carpet-coverage in the media. even if these acts are 
sporadically repressed by organs responsible for fighting crime, we have not seen 
any concrete action capable of diminishing the abovementioned sense of fear. 
this essay aims to identify the kinds of criminal organization known to 
us, the sectors in which they operate and their main characteristics, as well as 
the problems faced by agents of crime prevention and repression, particularly 
the Judiciary, in confronting organized Crime in Brazil. 
Types of Organized Crime
Considering the goals that inspire their operations, we can discern the 
existence of two kinds of criminal organization: those which engage in illegal 
activities with a view to achieving political and/or ideological ends, and those 
that, in a manner similar to a normal company, perpetrate illegal acts in pursuit 
of profit. In terminology proposed by the author, we could call the former 
“ideological” criminal organizations, and the latter “corporate” criminal 
organizations. However, more often than not the two will find themselves 
intercommunicating in virtue of an increasingly “globalized” approach to 
organized Crime, as even when they seek to conquer territories, break them 
up or win political power, these criminal organizations need to raise funds to 
finance their projects. 
ideological criminal organizations are a group given scant study. When 
the media, scholars or even the public speak of “organized Crime”, these 
groups are rarely what they have in mind. Indeed, the expression “organized 
Crime” – sometimes substituted by the term “mafia” – was incorporated into 
general parlance to describe a group that exploits a given branch of crime 
with a view to obtaining profit; in other words, the reference is always to the 
corporate type. 
these organizations, like normal companies, operate in such a way as 
maximizes profit. the difference is that, while legitimate enterprises pursue 
this goal through licit activities, criminal organizations seek their profit by 
illicit means, such as the trafficking of drugs or people.  
Concept
the first problem that arises in combating organized Crime is defining 
what it actually is. Far from being an academic question, there are important 
practical consequences involved, starting from the fact that Brazilian legislation 
sanctions the use of more invasive methods of policing in tackling criminal 
organizations, such as infiltration, audio and visual surveillance and controlled 
action – article 2 of Law no: 9034/95 -, than it does for investigating criminal 
activities not related to organized Crime. 
In this sense, article 1 of Law no. 9034/95, under the wording of Law 
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no.10219/01, determines that: “this law defines and regulates means of proof 
and investigative procedures applicable in case of crimes resulting from the 
illicit practices of criminal gangs, mobs, organizations or associations of any 
order”. 
the original wording of the law referred only to crimes perpetrated by 
gangs or mobs, which led some to assume (cf. Willian douglas in gomes et 
al., 2000, p.48-56) that the expression “organized Crime” had the same penal 
sense as “gang or mob”, which would contradict the understanding that the 
law was not supposed to apply to rudimentary criminal associations. 
Law no.10217/01 introduced the terms “organizations or associations 
of any order” to article 1, thus giving the law its current wording. the 
promulgation of the law obliged the doctrine to embark upon a search for a 
juridical meaning for “organized Crime” as distinct from the acts of “gangs 
or mobs”. as mentioned earlier, there were practicalities at stake in this search, 
as it concerned the employability of operational instruments of investigation 
and institutes permissible only in the situations prescribed by the law. In this 
regard, however, the law cited above failed to define what it understood by 
“criminal organization”.  
Faced with this legal omission, one could argue for the possibility of the 
term being defined by the doctrine, though this would offend the principle of 
legality, as “it is impossible to extract requisites for the definition of criminal 
conducts not already contained in pre-existing penal law from any doctrinal 
considerations, however coherent or well-grounded these may be. ” (ibidem)
Perceiving the gravity of the problem, the Commission in charge 
of drafting the bill for the reform of the special part of the Penal Code, 
presided over by the late minister evandro Lins e silva, proposed a definition 
of criminal organizations and their crimes along similar lines to that in the 
Italian legislation, which defines the crime of mafia association as follows:
art. 290. When two or more people form a group or association with the 
intent of committing crimes and neutralizing the effectiveness of action by 
public officials through the use of threatened or actual violence, corruption or 
fraud:
sentence – four to eight years imprisonment.  
However, as we all know, the bill was never approved by the national 
Congress.
the Palermo Convention1, however, duly integrated into the Brazilian 
legislation, defined an organized criminal group as “a structured group of 
three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with 
the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in 
accordance with this Convention in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit”. 
as such, whether we want this legal concept or not, criticize it or 
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not, the fact is that the obstacles that could be said to have stood in the way 
of the application of legislation to combat organized Crime in Brazil were 
definitively overcome in 2003. 
the concept as set forth in the Palermo Convention recognizes the 
ends that guide the operations of criminal organizations, namely the pursuit 
of financial or moral gains, thus confirming the assertion made above that 
the expression “organized Crime” is usually construed as meaning the 
exploitation of illicit means to secure financial gain. 
Characteristics
according to gomes & Cervini (1997), in order to warrant the 
definition of organized Crime, the organization must fulfill all the 
prerequisites of a gang or mob2 plus at least three of the following: a) objective 
of accumulating wealth; b) structured hierarchy; c) “businesslike” planning; 
d) sophisticated technology; e) functional division of activities; f) structural 
connection with public authorities; g) offer of social services; h) territorial 
division of illegal activities; i) serious power of intimidation; j) diffuse capacity 
to defraud; k) local or international connections with other organizations.
oliveira speaks along very similar lines (2004): 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines organized crime as any group 
having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is 
to obtain money through illegal activities. such groups maintain their position 
through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, 
or extortion.  the Brazilian national Federal Police academy, on the other 
hand, lists the following 10 characteristics: 1) Businesslike planning; 2) anti-
juridicality; 3) diverse scope of activity; 4) longevity of membership; 5) chain 
of command; 6) large number of agents; 7) compartmentalization; 8) code of 
honor; 9) territorial control; 10) pursuit of profit. 
Winfried Hassemar states that the characteristics of criminal organization 
activity include the corruption of the Judiciary and the political apparatus 
[Ziegler, 2003, p.63] tokatlian (2000: p.58-65] notes that, in Colombia, 
the criminal organizations behave in a businesslike manner, look to establish 
circles of influence, even within institutions of the state, and, consequently, 
relentlessly pursue financial and political power.
Mingardin (1996,p.69) identifies fifteen characteristics of organized crime: 
1) practice of illicit activities; 2) clandestine activities; 3) organizational 
hierarchy; 4) pursuit of profit; 5) division of labor; 6) use of violence; 7) 
symbiosis with the state; 8) illicit merchandise; 9) corporate planning; 10) use 
of intimidation; 11) sale of illicit services; 12) cronyism; 13) law of silence; 14) 
monopoly of violence; 15) territorial control…
of the various sources above, it is curious to note that the only one that 
failed to mention connections with public authorities was the Brazilian Federal 
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Police. 
one way or another, the fact remains that of all the abovementioned 
traits, there can be no doubt that connection with public authorities is the 
hallmark of truly organized criminality, followed by capacity to carry out 
diverse types of fraud, a high degree of operationality and constant mutation, 
all of which shall be examined more closely in the following pages. 
Connection with public authorities
For a long time organized Crime was viewed as an attempt on the part 
of a group to create a “Parallel state”.
under the influence of Hollywood movies, the popular image was of an 
organized Crime with its own rules, rapid and violent executions and internal 
judgments; a kind of shadow of the three powers of the state, with the ability 
to create laws, enforce them and judge from them. 
today, one could say that criminal organizations that operate in that 
way are exceptions3, as it is precisely through infiltrating the apparatus of 
power and by co-opting its officials that organized Crime looks to neutralize 
the repressive actions of the state; tactics, it would be no exaggeration to 
say, that have all but replaced violence and intimidation as the criminal 
organization’s modus operandi of choice 4.    
this characteristic did not go unnoticed to an astute Hassemer (1993, 
p. 85 ss), according to whom:
organized criminality requires more than just a well-run organization, or 
an international organization, but revolves, in the last analysis, around the 
corruption of the legislative branch, the magistrates, the attorney General’s 
office, the police; in short, the paralyzation of the  state in its combat of 
criminality… it is a diffuse criminality characterized by the absence of 
individual victims, the near-invisibility of the damage caused, and by a 
new modus operandi (careerism, division of labor, the participation of 
people “above suspicion”, sophisticated methods, etc.). More worrying 
still, for many it is the fruit of an individual choice and integrates certain 
cultures…
along similar lines, though more emphatically, gomes et al. (2000, 
p.8) note that:
force and violence are methods of no interest to them, basically because they 
end up attracting undesired attention from the press, the authorities and the 
population itself, which always exercise influence over policy initiatives. While 
they have unquestionable aptitude for intimidation, they can also generate 
repulsion, unpredictable revolt and unexpected backlashes. as such, criminal 
organizations are much better served by adopting less radical measures, 
opting for more discreet and subtle forms of interference in order to preserve 
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their capacity to operate. Injuring or killing, even from the juridical/penal 
perspective, results in material evidence, corpus delicti, a corpse  or an injured 
individual, while infiltration, the exchange of favors, the offering of certain 
benefits and other lighter techniques have the same practical effect while 
leaving far fewer visible traces.
We can therefore see that maintaining direct or indirect connections 
with the state is, without doubt, the key characteristic of organized Crime 
and, it is safe to say, its main means of ensuring operability, as it is only by 
infiltrating the governments, parliaments, police administrations and courts of 
justice that they can paralyze the hand that, theoretically, is supposed to strike 
them down and therefore achieve real impunity5.  
Diffuse criminality
another strong characteristic of organized Crime is that most of its 
activities do not directly point toward an individual victim. In fact, one can 
never immediately identify any single individual compromised by unmasked 
acts of dug trafficking, money laundering, cigarette contraband, arms dealing, 
corruption, etc. 
evidently, if we broaden the time-span, we readily observe that these 
criminal activities are vastly more prejudicial to society and to the state than 
those with immediate effect on a victim (such as theft, robbery, swindling, and 
so forth), as they interfere in the taxes levied by the state, the keeping of the 
peace and public order, the economy and free competition, etc. 
However, it is a fact that this characteristic – allied with a culture, 
particularly observable in Brazil, which treats affairs on the public level 
as somehow otherworldly or detached from the social situation on the 
ground – helps to ensure that, in some respects, such behaviors attract little 
opprobrium from the public in general, thus facilitating both the criminal 
practice itself and the free circulation of macro-delinquents in the social 
environment.  diffuse criminality is, effectively, transindividual and, as such, 
indivisible, with only indeterminate victims. this raises an important aspect: as 
there are no immediately identifiable victims, nor are there any instantly visible 
losses, not even in the medium-term. In other words, by the time we realize 
the perpetration of the crime, the damage is already immense and usually 
irreparable. 
Hence it is that the recovery of funds/products siphoned off by criminal 
organizations through illicit practices is, as yet, an incipient measure, especially 
when it comes to assets outside the country. one thing that is certain is that 
organized crime has sought to operate in spheres in which state control is 
precarious, such as the pensions fund, in which various cases of fraud have 
come to light - always with the involvement of people from inside the state 
apparatus itself –, inflicting enormous losses on society (diffuse victims) and 
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showing negligible rates of recovery. 
on this point, it seems needless to say that the damage done by these 
criminal organizations is devastating, but it is nevertheless important to 
underscore that their deeds often go undiscovered for lengths of time, if not 
forever6. this comes down to the characteristics of the organized criminal 
group itself, as mentioned above, which acts under the cover of the very 
people who are invested with the powers to fight it, i.e. public officials, duly 
corrupted, coopted and infiltrated.  the lack of direct individual victims, 
aggrieved and denouncing their losses, further complicates the identification 
and investigation of the felony, a context exacerbated by the power of 
intimidation wielded by organized crime.  
Mutation
Considering that the tentacles of organized Crime reach into the very 
state organs entrusted with investigating its activities, which tend to leave 
neither individual victims to raise the alarm, nor traces that could lead back to 
the true perpetrators, one can naturally understand the enormous difficulty 
police organs in particular face in tackling organized criminal groups.  Indeed, 
investigating criminal activity of this nature is painstaking work that involves 
personal risk to those involved and is highly prone to “leaks”. given all these 
difficulties, mapping and detailing the actions of these criminal groups 
requires lengthy periods of investigation, the success of which largely depends 
on the liberation of sufficient funds to equip the police accordingly, which 
we all know rarely occurs. as if that were not enough, we can also see that 
organized criminal groups constantly and intentionally alter their methods 
and procedures in order to ensure against predictability in their modes of 
operating. In order to do this, they use various companies as “fronts”, which 
they constantly change over time, as well as countless different “stooges”, bank 
accounts, etc.
after a time, just as the authorities are becoming familiar with these 
initiatives, they change the accounts, the companies and even the people 
who exercise certain “transferrable” functions. this gives rise to another key 
characteristic of organized Crime – the fungibility of non-strategic personnel 
inside the group. When this occurs, an investigation that has reached an 
advanced stage at enormous cost to the state and to the agents involved can 
be seriously compromised by the shift in modus operandi, another factor that 
makes it so difficult to map the organizational structure of these groups. 
The Brazilian reality
While it is not a unanimous position, it would seem that Brazil has yet 
to see a criminal group attain the same level of complexity as is observable in 
groups elsewhere, although this by no means prevents us from recognizing 
that organized Crime already extends throughout the entire national territory. 
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It is present, and 
frighteningly powerful. 
Its infiltration, in some 
states more so than 
in others, is clearly 
notable. In a certain 
sense the Brazilian state 
has been watching these 
developments with its 
arms folded. We might 
well recall countless 
much-publicized 
cases in which federal 
intervention would have 
been appropriate but 
was not forthcoming.  
Be that as it 
may, the fact remains 
that the Brazilian 
reality is highly 
propitious to the 
growth of criminal 
organizations just as 
complex, if not more 
so, than those we have 
seen in europe, the 
united states and asia. 
Firstly, because of the 
enormous ease with 
which companies can be opened, many of which manage to never actually 
operate without ever attracting suspicion. added to this is the fact that the 
anti-money laundering organs and mechanisms are utterly insufficient and 
statistically inoperative, although, in fairness, we must recognize a concerted 
effort to rectify this situation. Furthermore, clandestine currency exchange 
is scarcely repressed in Brazil. Currency can be exchanged in broad daylight, 
in full view of the police, with the greatest of ease, another aspect that 
facilitates the operations of these groups.
another Brazilian reality that must be considered is that the country 
is a major producer of the chemical materials the laboratories use to produce 
drugs and many of these products find their way to neighboring narcotics-
producing countries like Colombia and Bolivia. it is therefore no surprise 
that Brazil has undeniably become a save haven for some of the Colombian 
and european capos of the drugs trade, partly in virtue of its geographically 
colombian drug trafficker Juan carlos ramirez abadia, 
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strategic position as a connection between the americas and europe. 
Measures for fighting Organized Crime
First and foremost, it is essential to observe that none of the measures 
suggested herewith can be implemented unless there is a genuine political will 
to change the present context. any such measure must, by necessity, start by 
distancing the state organs and their officials from organized criminal groups. 
In other words, the promiscuity between organized Crime and the state has 
to be public enemy number one in this respect. the observation made, let us 
examine some of the legal instruments available. 
Initially, Law no. 9034/95 allowed the use of certain investigative 
means for targeting criminal organizations that were withheld in relation to 
crime in general. these measures, which we could call exceptional, were set 
down in article 2, and, contrary to the recent rulings of the supreme Federal 
Court, the device stipulated in clause III (“access to fiscal, banking, financial 
and electoral data, documents and information”) actually requires no prior 
judicial authorization. However, in relation to bank privacy, article 2, § 1 of 
LC 105/01 allows the Central Bank to breach the banking secrecy of anyone 
suspected of involvement in organized crime, while article 6 empowers the 
Inland revenue service to do the same with both banking and tax records.  
one way or another, it is understood that the attorney general’s 
office cannot breach banking secrecy directly, a fact that, without doubt, 
constitutes an obstacle in tackling organized Crime, the infamous swiftness 
of whose actions, including those that give an air of legality to the capital 
proceeds of crime, demand equal celerity from the official organs encumbered 
with tracking them down. the paradox is even greater when we consider 
that the Parliamentary Investigative Commissions, the so-called CPIs – are 
constitutionally entitled to breach any form of privacy, except through phone 
tapping (see article 58,§ 3 and item XII of article 5, both in the Federal 
Constitution of 1988).   
the issue surrounding rights of privacy is therefore a huge hindrance 
in the fight against organized Crime. In this respect, one recalls Hans Jurgen 
Fatkinhauer’s interesting comment (apud Zeigler, 2003, p.255) that “the 
crime lords of today are the only true cosmopolitans. they are citizens of the 
world”. Indeed, borders restrain the judiciary, but not the criminals. We can 
therefore note that the first obstacles the state must face are its own territorial 
limits, and thus the limits of its sovereignty, while, for organized crime, whose 
strong point is its transnationality, no such borders exist.    
thus we can agree with gomes et al. (2000,p.15-20) when they say 
that, although the legislation does contain devices for combating organized 
criminal activity, none of these will ever come close to being effective so long 
as the connection between organized Crime and the authorities continues 
to be overlooked. In fact, the struggle against organized criminality would 
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not be so difficult were it not for the symbiosis between the crooks and public 
officials7. the first step would seem to be to establish an educational measure 
capable of filling in the blanks left behind by decades of state negligence 
in relation to education and economic policy concerning the attainment of 
constitutional ideals. one cannot seriously hope to eradicate organized Crime 
when there are certain areas of state territory, like the shantytowns, in which 
the authorities do not have free transit, thus leaving room for organized 
Crime to exercise the power effectively abdicated by the state. the shaping of 
a true spirit of citizenship based on respect and human dignity is, therefore, 
paramount.
other urgent measures are the prevention and repression of symbiosis 
between the state and organized Crime. Prevention starts with greater 
attention being paid in the recruitment of state officials, especially those who 
will be involved in combating organized Crime, so as to reduce the number 
of infiltrations. once hired, the state must remain vigilant in its monitoring 
of these public agents, whether during a probationary stage or throughout the 
individual’s career. signs of undeclared wealth should be swiftly investigated 
and, in the case of wrongdoing, severely punished. one means of doing this 
would be to create a penal type, as has been done in other countries, like 
spain, on the “illicit enrichment of public functionaries”, under which all that 
need be proved is that the agent’s patrimony is incompatible with his or her 
declared income. another important move would be the implementation (and 
observation) of a code of ethics across the civil service as a whole that prohibits 
third-parties from offering courtesies, presents, trips, etc. recent events also 
testify to the importance of greater rigor in controlling electoral campaign 
donations, which open a considerable channel for money laundering and the 
corruption of public agents. 
on the side of repression, the state apparatus badly needs a counter-
intelligence sector geared towards rooting out infiltrations. In addition, a 
change of mentality is also required on the part of the relevant organs to 
avoid a spirit of ‘keeping things within the family’, so to speak, when they do 
discover that agents within their ranks have allied themselves, however briefly, 
with the enemy.     
Notes
1 ratified by Legislative directive 231/2003.
2 Crime typified in article 288 of the Penal Code. 
3 recently, however, the 2nd regional Federal Court heard a case which brought to light 
the existence of a group called “Clube Barrão drummond” which, according to the 
dispatch of Federal Magistrate abel gomes,  was set up to adjudicate on situations 
resulting from territorial disputes for control of the illegal “jogo do bicho” lottery 
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and the slot-machine market. this item can be read (in Portuguese) at the site www.
portalaz.com.br/noticia/policia/83305, accessed on sept. 9, 2007.   
4 this connection with the state can be forged directly or indirectly by the following 
means: a) financing of electoral campaigns; b) corruption of public officials (financially 
or through other favors); c) infiltration of members of the organization into strategic 
areas of the state apparatus, such as the police forces, attorney general’s office and 
Judiciary. For more details, see gomes et al. (2000, p.8-14). 
5 on this issue, see Ziegler (2003,p.64).
6 It would seem to be a consensus in the specialized literature that the “dark number”, 
that is, the deficit between the crimes practiced and those discovered, is far higher for 
those practiced by organized criminal groups. 
7 according to Mingardi (1994, p.144, apud gomes et al., 2000, p. 16).
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